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On Saturday 10 November 1798, an adjutant general in the army of the French Republic was 
marched into a court martial in Dublin baracks. He had been captured as part of an expedition 
dispatched to help the United Irish rebelion, which sought to establish an independent 
democratic republic with French aid. The prisoner, disgusted at being clamped in irons, had 
previously protested to both the military and civilian authorities in Ireland that he ought to be 
treated as befited a French citizen and a French oficer. On 9 November, he penned a leter 
intended for the Directory in Paris asking that they insist to the British government that the 
honour of the French nation and its armies be respected in his person. However, the folowing 
day, he was tried and found guilty of treason. His request to be shot rather than hanged like a 
criminal was denied, and he consequently cut his own throat. The wound was not fatal and he 
lingered, dying in agony on 19 November. The life and death of Theobald Wolfe Tone 
epitomised the link between Irish revolutionaries and the French Revolution. Tone formulated 
many of the key ideas of the Society of United Irishmen as they sought to translate the principles 
of the French Revolution to Irish conditions on their foundation in 1791, he helped initiate the 
programme of popular politicisation that would transform the United Irishmen into a 
revolutionary mass movement, and he personaly forged their military aliance with France in 
1796. In his final days, the man remembered in Ireland as the founder of Irish separatism 
proudly proclaimed his citizenship of the French revolutionary republic as wel as his dedication 
to the cause of Irish independence. This chapter examines the influence of the French 
Revolution on the world around it through a case study of the links between Irish revolutionaries 
and France, exploring the ideological impact of the Revolution in Ireland, as wel as the 
establishment of the Franco–United Irish military aliance. Irish revolutionaries, believing that 
the rights of man ofered the means to change the course of Irish history, sought to remake their 
world in the image of the French Revolution. 
 
‘We celebrated the 14th July with more pomp than it was done in any part of the world, save the 
Champ de Mars’1, claimed a proud Belfast man in May 1792. There is certainly a good case to 
be made that it was in Ireland that the ideas of the French Revolution – as opposed to its armies 
as in other parts of Europe – had their greatest impact; the 1798 rebelion was a civil war 
between those hoping to implement its ideas in Ireland and those opposed to them, as wel as a 
blow for separation from Britain. To understand the French Revolution’s impact on Irish 
political culture, it is important to grasp several structural factors deeply rooted in Irish history 
that conditioned that impact. Most important were the religious divisions among the population 
and the confessional state; Ireland’s relationship with Britain; economic progress, which saw 
the development of social and political forces capable of chalenging the established order by 
the time of the French Revolution; and the place of France itself within Irish political 
imaginations in the eighteenth century. 
 
In the aftermath of the victory of the forces loyal to Wiliam of Orange over those loyal to James 
I and Louis XIV, political power was monopolised by the adherents of the Established Church 
of Ireland (an Anglican church), who in the decades after 1691 passed a number of laws aimed 
at disenfranchising Irish Catholics and Dissenters (mostly Presbyterians, concentrated in the 
province of Ulster in the north-east). By 1727, these Penal Laws excluded Catholics from 
political power completely, and deprived Dissenters of the ability to hold important government 
posts, although Dissenters who met the property qualification retained the vote. The Penal Laws 
also sought to encourage conversion among Catholic landowners by spliting estates on 
inheritance unless they went to a protestant heir. Other laws targeted the religious practice of 
Catholics and Dissenters. As a result of these laws, Anglicans, about 10 per cent of the 
population, monopolized political power, and possessed the vast majority of land and wealth. 
Towards the end of the century, the term Protestant Ascendancy (with Protestant meaning 
specificaly Anglicans, rather than al Protestants) became a popular means to describe this 
monopoly of political power. Naturaly, there was a great deal of resentment among Catholics 
(about 80 per cent of the population) and Dissenters (about 10 per cent of the population) at 
their treatment, and the desire for religious equality lay at the heart of the revolutionary 
programme in the 1790s, and went far to explain its ability to atract mass support. 
 
Ultimate political power in Ireland did not, however, rest with the Protestant Ascendancy. It in 
fact lay with the government in London, as it was its military forces that sustained Ireland’s 
status quo. After the final defeat of the Franco–Jacobite forces in 1691, Ireland theoreticaly 
enjoyed the same constitution as England did folowing 1688, with power shared between king, 
lords and commons. Furthermore, Ireland was theoreticaly a sister kingdom of England (and, 
after 1707, Britain), linked through having the same monarch but equal in status. This was a 
fiction. Ireland did indeed have its own parliament, but it was subordinate to that at 
Westminster, a situation strengthened by Westminster’s Declaratory Act of 1720. The Irish 
parliament could not draw up bils, but only heads of bils, which were altered by the Privy 
Council in London, before being sent back for rejection or approval, but not further amendment. 
In addition, the lord lieutenants (viceroys) appointed by London used patronage to ensure a 
government majority in the Irish parliament. Laws made at Westminster restricted Irish trade. 
Resentment at this state of afairs among the Irish political elite and wider public opinion 
developed as the century progressed. The anger of patriots such as the writer Jonathan Swift 
centred on economic and legislative restrictions and caused occasional crises that were fairly 
easily overcome until the era of the American Revolution. With large numbers of troops sent 
from Ireland to America, a volunteer army sprang up that soon turned its atention to politics, 
demanding free trade (an end to British laws restricting Irish trade) and legislative independence 
(an end to Westminster’s superiority over the Irish parliament). The so-caled revolution of 
1782 forged by an aliance of the volunteers, parliamentary politicians, and public opinion 
achieved these goals. In reality, however, the viceroys continued to use patronage to manage 
the Irish parliament, where only one hundred of the three hundred seats were genuinely open 
to contestation. The crisis caused by George II’s ilness in 1788 nearly saw Ireland and Britain 
have a regent with fuler powers in Ireland than in Britain, reflecting the extent to which the 
Irish political elite was jealous of the powers of its parliament, even while accepting British 
management of it. The revolution of 1782 ultimately disappointed radical Irish patriots, being 
labeled by Wolfe Tone as ‘the most bungling imperfect business that ever threw ridicule on a 
lofty epithet’.2 On the other hand, British politicians such as the Prime Minister Wiliam Pit 
began to consider legislative union a superior arangement. Separation from Britain became 
another central part of the planned Irish revolution of the 1790s. 
 
Although Ireland was renowned at the time for the poverty of its peasantry, the eighteenth 
century in fact saw much economic progress, with an era of sustained growth (despite periods 
of reversal) beginning about 1740 and lasting until the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The 
provisions trade and the linen industry in particular flourished, and by 1789, industrial 
production in these areas could be found in Ulster, Munster and Leinster. The population grew 
at an unprecedented rate for Western Europe to about 5 milion between 1750 and 1800, and 
Dublin was easily the second city of the British Empire, and the sixth biggest in Europe. Both 
physical communications and the public sphere developed rapidly during the century, and by 
1792 there were at least 35 newspapers being published across the island, most often twice a 
week. The number of readers grew significantly, although the literacy rate may actualy have 
falen given the spectacular population growth. The middle classes – lawyers, doctors, 
merchants, printers, manufacturers and the like – grew in numbers, wealth, and influence. Many 
merchants and professionals were Catholics, and Dissenters dominated the linen industry. By 
1792, Ireland’s reputed richest man, Edward Byrne, was a merchant rather than a landowner, 
and a Catholic to boot. Due to the penal laws, then, many within the middle classes were 
excluded from the share in political power to which they felt their wealth, education and talent 
entitled them (echoing the feelings of French bourgeois revolutionaries like Danton). 
Associational culture and the culture of sociability saw increasing contact between people of 
diferent religions, and on major political questions such as economic development and the 
powers of the Irish parliament, atitudes were increasingly shared across religious lines. 
Inspired by the importance of political clubs in the French Revolution and the alternative they 
ofered to aristocratic traditional political institutions and assumptions, the Society of United 
Irishmen began life as a network of political clubs seeking to mobilize public opinion behind 
reform and dominated by the radical elements of the professional, mercantile and industrial 
bourgeoisie of Belfast and Dublin who were searching for a means to play a greater role in 
political life, and who believed that greater independence would mean greater national 
prosperity. Resistance to reform facilitated their embrace of revolution. The bulk of the 
revolutionaries of the 1790s were drawn from the artisanate, schoolmasters, and later from an 
increasingly politicized peasantry, many of whom had benefited from proto-industrialization. 
The economic growth of recent decades created the conditions for the revolutionary chalenge 
to emerge from the middle and lower orders. 
 
In the aftermath of the Wiliamite victory over the Franco-Jacobite forces, France took on 
conflicting roles in Irish political culture. Seen as the home of spiritual and temporal despotism, 
and economicaly backward, it was the antithesis of everything Irish Protestants liked to think 
the British and Irish political system stood for. For Irish Catholics, France represented a source 
of hope, the country most likely to restore the Stuart king, their church and their community in 
general to their rights, estates and possessions. Many Irish Catholics entered the French military 
service in 1691 and the folowing decades. French invasion seemed the solution to many 
problems, and the French considered the possibility of invasion during the various wars with 
Britain. Hope for an invasion persisted among many within the Catholic and Gaelic-speaking 
lower orders even after French support for the Stuarts had ended. At the same time, however, 
France was recognized within Irish intelectual culture as Europe’s leading cultural centre, and 
a beacon of Enlightenment. The era of the American Revolution saw many of the more hostile 
atitudes breaking down. Many Irish patriots sympathized, to some degree at least, with the 
Americans, and Louis XVI’s role in bringing liberty to America saw some reappraise their 
atitude towards him. By the late 1780s, contrasts were even being drawn between Louis XVI’s 
increasing toleration towards Protestants, and the failure to further relax the penal laws in 
Ireland. The Revolution then transformed atitudes towards France, before the war caused a 
further fundamental shift as support for France became treasonous. When a commitee of Irish 
revolutionaries approached the French about arms and aid in 1792; when the French sent agents 
to Ireland in 1793 and 1794 to sound out Irish radicals about the possible reaction to a potential 
invasion; and when the United Irishmen dispatched Tone to Paris in 1795 to negotiate for an 
invasion, they were appealing to a long tradition that envisaged the overthrow of the Irish status 
quo by an aliance of domestic rebels and French troops, albeit it one transformed by the 
Revolution. The aliance between Irish and French revolutionaries was in many senses, then, a 
case of old wine in new botles, the result of geopolitics as wel as ideology. 
 
How did the French Revolution make its impact on Irish politics? In 1796, Tone ascribed its 
influence to the Burke-Paine debate. ‘This controversy, and the gigantic event which gave rise 
to it, changed in an instant the politics of Ireland’.3 Jim Smyth’s remark that ‘Public opinion 
was initialy stirred in a dramatic way by the debate which the revolution provoked between 
Edmund Burke and Thomas Paine’ reflects a historiographical consensus that agrees with 
Tone.4 However, an examination of the Irish press demonstrates that the reason Burke and Paine 
stired such a debate in Ireland was precisely because the Revolution had already made a 
substantial impact on public opinion, and had already begun to reshape the terms of Irish 
politics. To understand the Revolution’s impact on Irish political culture, then, we need to alter 
the accepted chronology that led to the creation of a mass revolutionary movement, and also 
place less emphasis on the Burke–Paine debate, while recognizing its substantial importance. 
 
Given France’s place in Irish culture, and its position within European geopolitics and culture, 
the events that made up the pre-Revolution were naturaly folowed closely. Many newspapers 
printed accounts of French events and commented on them, and frequently documents from 
both the monarchy and the opposition were printed in Irish newspapers.5 This was particularly 
true in Ulster, where the United Irishmen would later be strongest. Comment tended to take the 
side of the patriot opposition, and some of it displayed a keen insight into what was at stake. 
The Belfast Newsleter remarked that ‘the day on which the Notables met wil form an era in 
the Liberties of France, which future historians may look to with astonishment. On that day, the 
Monarchy of the country had its deepest wound: for then Government had recourse to the 
People for power … And what the Notables began, the Parliaments wil finish.’6 
 
Once the Bastile fel, the Irish press became obsessed with events in France, with extensive 
reports of debates in the various assemblies, oficial documents, eyewitness accounts, leters 
from people resident in or visiting France, and comment on the Revolution from the editors and 
readers becoming a staple of Irish newspapers. References to the Revolution also filed the 
pages of innumerable pamphlets, and soon found their way into debates in the Irish parliament 
as wel. In the months and years that folowed 14 July 1789, Irish people discussed and debated 
the Revolution incessantly, with atempts made across the political spectrum to associate their 
policies with the positive aspects of events in France, or to link opponents to negative aspects 
of events in France either before or during the Revolution. The sense that events in Ireland were 
linked to, or even depended upon, events in France quickly became widespread. When Irish 
people took positions on the French Revolution, if they read the newspapers (or listened to 
others read them aloud), they took informed positions.  
 
The storming of the Bastile was welcomed across the Irish political spectrum, but 
disagreements soon arose over whether it had lessons to teach Ireland. The reformist Dublin 
Evening Post noted that ‘the ghost of French tyranny’ could be seen in the recent prosecutions 
of newspaper owners.7 Supporters of the status quo believed that Ireland already had an 
excelent political constitution, whereas reformers believed that lessons needed to be learned 
from France to overcome the limitations that had stymied atempts to achieve parliamentary 
reform after 1782. Belfast Whigs toasted ‘the present Spirit of France al over the world – three 
times three.’8 The extent to which reformers regarded the French Revolution as a decisive 
moment was revealed by the Belfast Newsleter’s comment that it was ‘the most glorious 
Revolution the world has ever witnessed.’9 1688 was central to the self-image of the newspaper 
and its readership as protestant Whigs. The suggestion that it had been surpassed by a revolution 
in a Catholic country that had been synonymous with despotism meant that a new world of 
possibilities had opened up, and the reform campaign was reenergized by the example of France 
in the run-up to the 1790 general election, where an aliance of radical and moderate reformers 
saw a good deal of success for the Whigs, who took both of the most prestigious seats in 
parliament, those representing Dublin city.  
 
Although the Revolution inspired a widespread belief that the age of universal liberty was about 
to dawn, there was stil a long way to go before a revolutionary movement would emerge. 
However, there is evidence from 1790 that some of those who would go on to found and lead 
the United Irishmen throughout their existence were already contemplating revolution. This 
primarily takes the form of a fake Address from the National Assembly of France to the People 
of Ireland that was serialized in opposition newspapers in Dublin and Belfast and printed as a 
pamphlet in Dublin in August 1790. It was produced by a group of Dublin radicals known as 
the Whigs of the Capital. The Whigs of the Capital were drawn mainly from the middle orders 
and the artisanate and were led by the mercurial Dublin city politician James Napper Tandy, 
whose activities would soon see him fleeing the country to avoid a capital charge of taking an 
ilegal oath, and who would lead the last of the French flotilas that sought to intervene in 1798. 
Many of the United Irishmen’s ideas, much of their rhetoric, and their strategy of popular 
politicization were anticipated within the pages of the Address. It therefore ofers an insight 
into the early development of the revolutionary movement in Ireland. 
 
The Address was fundamentaly a cal for the people of Ireland to achieve freedom, both in how 
they governed themselves and independence from Britain. It also portrayed a Europe about to 
fight a civil war, a Manichean struggle between the forces of liberty, led by revolutionary 
France, and those of the old regime of monarchy, aristocracy and clergy, which would be led 
by Britain, a nation that caled itself free but sought to deny freedom to others (i.e. Ireland). It 
held out the prospect of French and Irish patriots united and galvanizing the international 
struggle for liberty. It thus demonstrated the mixture of patriotism and internationalism 
characteristic of those who believed in the ‘brotherhood of humanity’ in the age of revolution.10 
 
The Address was firm in its rejection of the supposed British and Irish constitutional tradition 
of gradual reform, instead arguing that the rights of man were the only principles on which a 
government ought to be founded. France, it said, had aroused such hostility from the 
‘aristocracies of the earth’ because it had founded its government on the rights of man, declaring 
law to be the expression of the general wil, embracing meritocracy and making government 
truly representative of the people. In doing so, the Revolution had declared that any society that 
did not guarantee equal rights to al its citizens had ‘NO CONSTITUTION’.11 It was this 
demonstration that had aroused British opposition, according to the Address. Despite its 
pretensions, it argued, Ireland had no real constitution due to its confessional state. Nor could 
the curent system be efectively reformed – it would have to be replaced. The French had 
realized the inadequacy of ‘merely keeping the ruins in repair’ and rebuilt ‘from the very 
foundation. – By doing so, we discovered the holowness and instability of those artificial 
principles on which some nations so fondly rest. Political abuses must be overturned completely 
and at once, or not at al – A slow and partial reform always ends where it begun.’12 
 
The Address asserted the need for revolutionary change (though the means for achieving this 
were not discussed). Such change would entail true independence from Britain, a complete 
change of Ireland’s political system to make it genuinely representative, the end of the 
aristocratic social order, and the abolition of religious discrimination. In al this, and in its 
emphasis on forgeting past hostilities, it prefigured key elements of the ideology of the United 
Irish revolutionaries. However, the pamphlet defended the distinction between active and 
passive citizens in France, suggesting that even Ireland’s most radical elements had not yet 
embraced universal manhood sufrage. Nor was there any mention of a republic. As in France 
itself, it would be events over the next few years that created mass support for democratic 
republicanism.  
 
The Address aimed to mobilize the middle and lower orders of Dublin behind the Whigs of the 
Capital, but failed. Its authors were forced to accept that public opinion was not yet ready to 
embrace such radical sentiments. Instead, they concentrated for now on working for more 
limited reform with the parliamentary Whig Club, and on propaganda about the need for change 
at home and the benefits of the Revolution for the people of France. The Address deployed a 
central theme in revolutionary propaganda, whereby France was held up as an exemplar to be 
folowed. To their enemies, the Whigs of the Capital were ‘a few obscure men’ seeking to 
overturn the established order for their own gain. Their atempts to spread the ‘political 
delusion’ of ‘tucking up necks’ in Ireland in imitation of France deserved punishment, but so 
secure was the liberty gained by Ireland’s ‘renovated constitution’ in 1782 that there was no 
need to deliver it.13 
 
The themes of the Address and the atacks on the Whigs of the Capital serve to ilustrate how 
many of the many themes of both Reflections on the Revolution in France and Rights of Man, 
Part I already figured prominently in Irish discussion of the Revolution and its possible lessons 
before either work was published. The Revolution made its initial impact through the extensive 
newspaper coverage provided across the island, and the debate that coverage sparked. Debate 
on the Revolution was caried on not just in those pages, but in the broader public sphere. By 
the time Reflections appeared, the conservative Irish press had already turned against the 
Revolution, and had never accepted it had anything to teach Ireland. Paine strengthened 
reforming opinion in favor of the Revolution, and moderate reformers only turned against the 
Revolution in large numbers once war had been declared in 1793. Rights of Man also played an 
extremely prominent part in the eforts to politicize the lower orders in the early 1790s. 
 
How did the Burke-Paine debate on the Revolution aid the development of a revolutionary 
movement in Ireland? It was not just through Paine’s rendering of the rights of man in a form 
easily comprehensible to the lower orders in town and countryside. Rights of Man had a 
galvanizing efect on Irish radicals, who commited themselves to ensuring that it would get 
into the hands of the lower orders. The Whigs of the Capital produced the world’s first cheap 
edition of Rights of Man, Part I, paying for it through a subscription. It was one of seven Irish 
editions, another of which was produced by radicals in Derry. In November 1791, Paine claimed 
40,000 copies had been sold in Ireland, and Irish revolutionaries would use it as one of their 
main propaganda weapons throughout the 1790s.14 The momentum created by the success of 
Paine’s arguments with the public, and the efort to produce the cheap edition, carried over into 
the summer. In Belfast, an aliance of Whigs and radicals set about organizing a 
commemoration of the fal of the Bastile modeled on the Revolution’s own Feast of the 
Federation.  
 
Belfast, centre of the Irish linen industry, had long been the capital of Irish radicalism. A mainly 
Presbyterian town with a vibrant economy and well-established bourgeoisie, it was ruled by an 
Anglican clique in the pocket of the local landed aristocrat. Something of the political flavor of 
the place may be gleaned from the fact that one of the local pubs was named the Benjamin 
Franklin, whose portrait hung outside – only a few years after the American revolutionaries had 
humiliated the British and left the empire. The Volunteers had remained highly active in Belfast, 
and their activities were largely directed by a secret commitee of radicals drawn from the local 
middle classes. These were the men most responsible for organizing the Bastile 
commemoration, and they would provide the impetus for the foundation of the United Irishmen 
in October 1791, and its transformation into a mass revolutionary movement beginning in 1792. 
The Volunteer companies they controled became the nucleus for their underground army.  
 
The commemoration was a huge success, the biggest demonstration ever seen in Belfast (and 
one of at least nine in Ireland). The event struck a self-consciously internationalist tone, with a 
banner of Franklin bearing the quotation ‘Where Liberty is…THERE IS MY COUNTRY’. The 
Revolution represented the ‘TRIUMPH OF HUMAN NATURE’, not merely of Frenchmen. 
The lessons for Ireland were made clear in the resolutions passed and toasts drunk at the 
celebrations. Included among these was the statement that ‘we wish ALL CIVIL AND 
RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE annihilated in this land’. However, this was not as radical a 
statement as Wiliam Drennan, the resolutions’ author, had intended. Although Belfast’s 
radicals had embraced the idea of political rights for Catholics, the moderate reformers had not, 
and the original resolution had to be toned down to secure unanimous support. This failure to 
secure greater support for their interpretation of what the principles of the French Revolution 
should mean when applied to Ireland had major implications for radical politics in Ireland. 
Firstly, it led Tone to pen An Argument on Behalf of the Catholics of Ireland (August 1791) 
and secondly, it convinced Belfast’s radicals of the need for a new movement, and helped lead 
to the foundation of the United Irishmen in October 1791. 
 
Tone’s Argument was the most successful Irish pamphlet of the 1790s, seling 6,000 copies. Its 
target audience was the Presbyterians of Ulster. Tone argued that the French Revolution proved 
that Catholics possessed the capacity for liberty. Irish Catholics, he said, were no less prepared 
for liberty than their French counterparts. He appealed to Irish Protestants to put aside their 
traditional hostilities, and look at the world as it stood now. The ‘rusty and extinguished 
thunderbolts of the Vatican’ meant nothing to French or Irish Catholics. He reminded his 
readers that the ‘rights of man are at least as wel understood there [France] as here, and 
somewhat beter practiced’.15 Tone’s pamphlet succeeded in turning the tide in Ulster on the 
Catholic question in favor of the radicals, so that on 28 January 1792 the radicals easily won a 
vote on the issue at a Belfast town meeting.  
 
The strong dissenting religious beliefs of much of Ulster’s population also helped them embrace 
the principles of the French Revolution and, later, the idea of armed revolution. Many 
interpreted the French Revolution and the destruction of the absolute monarchy in the eldest 
daughter of the Catholic Church as a sign that the second coming was imminent. They believed 
that in supporting the French Revolution and fighting against monarchy, aristocracy and the 
privileges of the Established Church at home they were literaly doing God’s work. The United 
Irishmen exploited such belief by spreading prophecies supporting this line of thought both 
verbaly and in print.  
 
The foundation of the Society of United Irishmen was an atempt to reshape Irish politics using 
a mobilized public opinion, in the manner in which political clubs operated in France. In the 
words of Thomas Addis Emmet, a prominent United Irish leader, the world was indebted to the 
Revolution for ‘completely demonstrating the political eficacy of clubs’.16 The inaugural 
resolutions reflected how the Revolution shaped United Irish thinking: 
 
In the present great era of reform, when unjust Governments are faling in every quarter 
of Europe; when religious persecution is compeled to abjure her tyranny over conscience; 
when the rights of men are ascertained in theory and that theory substantiated by practice; 
when antiquity can no longer defend absurd and oppressive forms against the common 
sense and common interest of mankind; when al government is acknowledged to 
originate from the people and to be so far only obligatory as it protects their rights and 
promotes their welfare: we think it our duty, as Irishmen, to come forward and state what 
we feel to be our heavy grievance and what we know to be its efectual remedy.17 
 
In other words, the French Revolution inspired the United Irishmen to think that change was 
possible, if not inevitable, and demonstrated to them how best to achieve it. Ireland’s main 
problem was that ‘WE HAVE NO NATIONAL GOVERNMENT’ but instead merely the 
servants of Britain. The solution lay in ‘AN EQUAL REPRESENTATION OF ALL THE 
PEOPLE IN PARLIAMENT’ to be achieved through building ‘a cordial union among ALL 
THE PEOPLE OF IRELAND’, of al religious denominations.18 Once built, this union would 
secure a new constitution based on the rights of man. Although couched in terms of reform, this 
was a revolutionary vision, one where the political, social and religious underpinnings of the 
status quo would be done away with.  
 
There has been debate amongst Irish historians about whether the reformist programme of the 
United Irishmen in the phase before they were made ilegal in 1794 represented their true aims. 
It is argued here firstly that the revolutionary implications of the reforms they did advocate need 
to be recognized, and secondly that there is ample evidence that for the majority of the 
leadership these were only a starting point, and that they had in mind total separation from 
Britain and a genuinely representative form of government as their ultimate aim. In a leter of 
summer 1791 that was later used by the Irish government against them, Tone told the Belfast 
radicals who invited him to help found the United Irishmen that he believed that separation was 
essential, and his diaries for the years 1791–92 record several conversations indicating that 
United Irish leaders were already contemplating the possibility of an armed uprising. As wil 
be discussed below, the use of French political symbolism also suggests they had embraced 
revolutionary republican democracy early on. 
 
At first, the United Irishmen used constitutional means of agitation. Wel aware that the Irish 
parliament could never be the vehicle for procuring change, they began an intensive campaign 
of popular politicization, hoping that pressure out-of-doors would force change upon a reluctant 
political elite. Key to this was their newspaper, the Northern Star, which rapidly became 
Ireland’s most popular journal. The Northern Star prioritized news from France, and, until its 
presses were smashed by government troops in 1797, consistently published pieces praising the 
French Revolution. It also printed articles such as a ‘Dialogue between an Aristocrat and a 
Democrat’ (4 April 1792) that left litle doubt where the United Irishmen stood. The United 
Irish press (they published several other newspapers and many pamphlets) played a central role 
in their campaign to ‘make every man a politician’, but they used every means of propaganda 
available to them skilfuly – handbils, songs, poetry, oaths, humor, public gatherings, sporting 
events, funerals al were exploited to cary their message to the people in simple and 
comprehensible language.19 
 
Inspired by the leading role of the Volunteers in 1782, the United Irishmen atempted to revivify 
them. The United Irishmen sought to build support for a national reform convention drawn from 
Volunteer units and political societies that would force change from government. At the same 
time, the Catholic Commitee was organizing a Catholic convention to demand political rights. 
Every adult male in every parish in Ireland could theoreticaly contribute to the choice of the 
delegates in an electoral system its opponents claimed was modeled on that of France. Tone, 
having replaced Edmund Burke’s son Richard as secretary to the Catholic Commitee earlier 
that year in a very deliberate appointment by the Commitee, was central to its organization. 
The United Irishmen and their alies were chalenging the status of parliament as the legitimate 
political representative of the nation.  
 
Concern about this turn of events among the elite was greatly heightened when in late 1792 the 
United Irishmen in Dublin announced the formation of a Volunteer corps caled the National 
Batalion, which was clearly modeled on the French National Guard. Its uniform was similar 
in appearance to the National Guard and cost litle to facilitate membership among the poor. In 
the words of a government informer, the green and white striped trousers were those of the 
‘Sans Culantes [sic]’.20 Catholics were invited to join in an assertion of their rights as men and 
citizens. The symbol adopted for the new unit was the Irish harp but without the crown above 
it: a specificaly republican symbol. Arming the poor and Catholics also symbolized a 
commitment to democracy. The National Batalion revealed its authors as revolutionary 
republican democrats. The corps never took of, but its emergence contributed a great deal to 
the government decision to ban the Volunters in late 1792 and early 1793.  
 
At the same time as the National Batalion was being formed, the first atempt was made by 
Irish revolutionaries to gain material support from France. A stil-mysterious Revolutionary 
Commitee made contact with the French in London. In the course of these contacts, invasion 
was discussed and artilery requested. The French embassy in London reported to the Girondin 
government that Ireland was on the verge of revolution, a view endorsed by the former consul 
in Dublin.21 This was not the case, but reading the fears expressed in the conservative press it 
is understandable why some might think so, especialy when the activities (real and imagined) 
of French agents in Britain were causing real fears of revolution there at the same time. 
Marianne Eliot has speculated that the Commitee was made up of Defenders, an oath-bound 
armed secret society.22 The Defenders had emerged in the mid-1780s during sectarian troubles 
in county Armagh, but they were now spreading throughout the island, and mixed pro-French 
revolutionary politics with social, economic and religious grievances. While some Defenders 
were nakedly sectarian, it was for taking the Defender oath that the protestant Tandy was forced 
to flee the country. 
 
During 1793, fearing revolt, the government moved to choke of alternative expressions of 
political opinion and to strengthen the repressive apparatus of the state. As wel as the 
Volunteers being banned, the Convention Act banned unoficial elected assemblies, the 
Gunpowder Act sought to control weapons outside government hands, and a new militia was 
created, sparking massive riots. The propaganda campaign against the United Irishmen was 
stepped up, and some members prosecuted. Catholics were granted the right to vote, but denied 
the chance to sit in parliament, leaving a legacy of biterness. When added to the economic 
dislocation caused by the war, these circumstances transformed the political situation in Ireland, 
creating suficient discontent for a mass revolutionary movement to emerge. It became clear to 
the United Irishmen that constitutional means could not work, and in their eyes the constitution 
had efectively been overturned. The population was angered and radicalized by the Catholic 
question, the militia riots and the war. In Ulster, the work of building an underground United 
Irish organization had in fact begun during 1792. The foundation of three French-inspired 
societies in December 1792 – the Republicans, the Federates and the Irish Jacobins – in Belfast 
was indicative of a more open embrace of revolution. The fact that the cannon of the newly-
banned radical Belfast Volunteers were hidden rather than surrendered to government is also 
teling. It was not until 1794 that the United Irishmen were banned, and until 1795 that the 
underground organization began to spread far beyond Ulster. The sometimes dificult and 
incomplete merger of the United Irishmen with the Defenders starting that year created a mass 
revolutionary underground movement across most of the island. 
 
During 1792, Tom Paine and Irish revolutionaries in Paris such as Lord Edward Fitzgerald and 
Henry Sheares lobbied the French government to explore the possibility of invading Ireland. 
They were pushing at something of an open door, given the fact that France had long regarded 
Ireland as Britain’s potential weak spot. The presence of many Irishmen and men of Irish 
descent in the French military increased the likelihood of a French atempt at invasion. British 
involvement in the Vendée practicaly guaranteed it. In March 1793, Eleazer Oswald arrived in 
Dublin on behalf of the Girondin government. Fitzgerald, back in Ireland, introduced him to 
some of the Dublin leaders of the United Irishmen, but not to the northern leaders and those 
who were closest to them in Dublin. Possibly suspicious that he was an agent provocateur, they 
told him that nothing could be done in the curent circumstances of government reaction. This 
did not, of course, rule out the possibility of a diferent response in diferent circumstances. In 
the event, Oswald returned disappointed. The French did not give up. 
 
Robespiere and the Jacobins rejected Girondin internationalism and adventurism, as 
Anarchisis Cloots and others found to their cost. However, the Commitee of Public Safety 
continued to contemplate an invasion of Ireland, though possibly they were motivated by the 
desire for revenge as much as by any spirit of internationalism. Their agent, the Irish-born 
Anglican Reverend Wiliam Jackson, arived in Dublin on 3 April 1794, having been sent to 
Britain and Ireland to canvas opinion on likely reactions to a French invasion. He had spoken 
of the real purpose of his trip to a friend in London, John Cockayne, who had immediately gone 
to government, and been told to accompany Jackson and spy on him. Jackson made contact 
with the United Irishmen, and began a series of meetings with Archibald Hamilton Rowan and 
Tone. The United Irishmen were much more positive about the prospect of an invasion than 
they had been the previous year, perhaps reflecting how low their political fortunes in Dublin 
had sunk. The British radicals he spoke to told Jackson that a French invasion there would be 
fiercely resisted, but Rowan and Tone assured Jackson that the Irish people as a whole would 
welcome the invaders as liberators.  
 
The accounts of public opinion they wrote for Jackson to take back to France somewhat 
flatened out the complexity of the situation, but gave a clear message that a large-scale invasion 
would be welcome. They argued that both the Catholics and the Dissenters greatly desired 
independence from Britain and a change of government, even if for diferent reasons. They 
naturaly stressed the extent of support for the Revolution within Ireland, but also talked about 
deep-seated hatred for England among the people. They emphasized the need for a strong 
invasion force if the people were to rise in its support. Tone’s version also argued that ‘very 
much, perhaps the whole, success of the measure would depend upon the manifesto to be 
published on the landing being efected.’23 The French must stress that they came as liberators 
and alies, to guarantee the rights of the people, and not as conquerors. The fundamentals of 
this document were repeated by Tone in every memorandum he wrote for the Directory and its 
military oficials folowing his arrival in Paris as United Irish ambassador in 1796. On 24 April 
1794, Jackson was arrested, and Rowan shortly thereafter. Tone escaped arrest as it was Rowan 
the authorities were after, but also because he had been more careful, not speaking in front of 
Cockayne and burning documents in his own handwriting. In the event, Rowan escaped to Paris 
where he had a personal interview with Robespiere, and another with the Commitee of Public 
Safety, but after Thermidor he soon left for America. Tone negotiated a deal whereby he would 
implicate himself and no one else, and be banished from the kingdom. Jackson was tried and 
convicted, dramaticaly dying of poison he had taken in the dock. 
 
The Jackson afair was a victory for the government, but also a boost for the revolutionaries. 
The government took the opportunity to make the United Irishmen ilegal. However, it proved 
to the revolutionaries and the masses whose support they wanted that the French were serious 
about the prospect of an invasion, thus adding greatly to the credibility of the developing 
revolutionary underground. 
 
It was the Jackson afair that set Tone on the course that would end in his suicide. He had 
refused Jackson’s requests to go to France but in 1795 left for exile in America with plans to 
head ultimately to France. He immediately made contact with the French Ambassador in 
Philadelphia, Adet, who responded cooly. Disheartened, Tone setled near Princeton, only to 
be urged back into action by several leters from home assuring him that the tide of public 
opinion had turned in the United Irishmen’s favor, and urging him to go to France. He 
approached Adet once more, who by then had been told to encourage him, and who sent him to 
France with leters of recommendation. Once he arived in France, Tone, guided by the US 
ambassador James Monroe, quickly made contact with Carnot, whose questions about the 
harbor at Cork at their first meeting convinced Tone he was already contemplating an invasion. 
The ful story of Tone’s negotiations with the French, and those of other United Irishmen, has 
been told in Eliot’s magisterial Partners in Revolution, and need not be repeated here. 
 
The eficacy of Tone’s diplomacy is remarkable, even alowing for the factors mentioned above 
that to some degree pre-disposed the French to an invasion of Ireland. He arived in France on 
1 February. By June preparations to invade Ireland under the leadership of General Lazare 
Hoche, one of the Republic’s star commanders, had begun. It was December before they set 
sail with 15,000 batle-hardened troops, complete with 40,000 stand of arms and a manifesto 
writen by Tone promising liberation, not conquest. The fleet evaded the Royal Navy, but was 
broken up by atrocious weather. Tone spent several agonizing days just of the Irish coast at 
Bantry Bay unable to land, and the fleet limped home.  
 
The near miss at Bantry Bay was a visible demonstration of French intentions, and many 
thousands rushed to join the United Irishmen. Some hoped to be on the winning side when the 
French made what everyone assumed would be a second atempt in the near future. According 
to their own records, United Irish numbers peaked at a huge 280,000. Low-level conflict 
between the forces of the state and the revolutionary movement intensified. But while it boosted 
the United Irishmen, Bantry Bay was also the beginning of the end. The government responded 
ruthlessly, unleashing a white teror on the United Irishmen’s stronghold, popularly 
remembered as the dragooning of Ulster. The movement never recovered from the blows 
inflicted on it. Sectarian tensions increased, with rumors that both Protestants and Catholics 
were planning to massacre their religious rivals spreading rapidly during 1797 and 1798. Both 
oficial and unoficial loyalist bodies dedicated to defeating the revolutionary chalenge became 
beter organized. 
 
Divisions also grew among the United Irishmen over strategy and over their atitude to France. 
One result of popular politicization had been to increase nervousness among some of their 
propertied elements about social order in the event of a successful rebellion. Those United Irish 
leaders harboring such fears were wedded to the invasion strategy, believing that a French army 
was the best guarantee of securing order and property rights. Other United Irish leaders argued 
that, with no sign of another invasion, France could not be relied upon and that, given 
government atacks on the movement, they had to strike quickly on their own. Although the 
popular image of France remained that of the land of liberty and the revolutionary armies 
continued to be seen mainly as liberators, French treatment of conquered teritories and 
incessant counter-revolutionary propaganda on that topic did reduce the popularity of the 
Revolution, and some who previously would have welcomed invasion now feared it. Fearful of 
sectarian violence, and sensing a shift in the balance of power towards government, many 
abandoned the United Irishmen for the loyalist cause in the months before the Rebelion broke 
out in May 1798, and even during it. 
 
The 1798 Rebelion was far from that Irish revolutionaries originaly envisaged, due to the 
repression after Bantry Bay, the arest of much of the national leadership, desertions, sectarian 
tensions, and the failure of the French to invade. The French, caught unawares by the Rebelion 
and with their atention having shifted to Egypt and continental Europe, proved able to send 
only a number of smal flotilas with a smal number of troops, and after the Rebelion had been 
largely defeated. Their intervention was almost the opposite of what Tone and the United 
Irishmen had long sought. The main force that landed comprised only around 1,500 men, and 
though, in aliance with hastily raised locals, it won one spectacular victory and a number of 
smaler engagements, it was ultimately easily defeated. While the surendering French were 
wel-treated, many of their native alies were kiled after the fighting had stopped. The Rebelion 
left a legacy of suspicion of the French among the Irish for failing to provide suficient support, 
and of the Irish among the French as the Irish revolutionary forces had not proved as substantial 
as they had been led to believe. Whereas the Irish had been treated as serious players before, 
they were now viewed as more akin to the band of patriots from across Western Europe whose 
promises of support for the Revolution and for invading troops had proven holow.  
 
Nevertheless, there remained a deep reservoir of support for the French Revolution, its 
principles, and the prospect of an invasion in Ireland. When Robert Emmet was atempting to 
generate support for what would prove to be his abortive rebelion in 1803, he impersonated a 
French army oficer, on the grounds that a widespread belief that the French were coming was 
key to his prospects of success. Although many former United Irishmen did make their peace 
with the existing regime in Ireland, especialy as Napoleon’s power grew, it seems that had 
Napoleon invaded he would have met with a substantial popular uprising in his support.  
 
The French Revolution inspired Irish revolutionaries with a belief that they were living at the 
dawn of a new era in world history, and that in this new era anything was possible. In their eyes, 
the principles and example of the French Revolution ofered the means to break free from the 
shackles of Irish history, to forge a united, free and prosperous people liberated from both the 
sectarian divisions of the past and British control. They looked at the new political culture being 
forged in the Revolution, and sought to adapt its methods and principles to Irish conditions. 
They created a new ideology that was both recognisable as a local example of the revolutionary 
democracy convulsing the Atlantic world, and distinctly Irish. It reflected their interests as 
members of the bourgeoisie and popular classes, and as members of the 90 per cent of the Irish 
population that sufered religious discrimination. If implemented, whether peacefuly or 
violently, it would have revolutionised the political, social, and religious status quo. A 
revolutionary vision of what Irish society could look like existed before the French Revolution, 
but the influence of the Revolution sharpened that vision, dramaticaly increased its popularity, 
and made it seem much more realistic. Unlike much of Europe, the Revolution’s primary 
influence lay in the realm of ideas and in its domestic example, rather than in the experience of 
French troops and French administrators. This contributed to the persistence of a popular vision 
of the Revolution more akin to the reality of 1792–94 than life under the Directory. 
Nevertheless, the Directory’s dealings with Ireland do reveal a great deal of revolutionary 
idealism, both among the political elite and at a popular level in the army. The French 
Revolution made a major impact on Irish politics earlier than is often believed, and through 
diferent means. The intensity of Ireland’s Burke-Paine debate was the result of a pre-existing 
dividing line that cut across print culture and political debate, one that was fostered primarily 
by extensive newspaper coverage, which brought the message of the French Revolution to the 
lower orders. The political ideologies created in the whirlwind of the 1790s – republicanism, 
unionism, democracy – have to a large extent shaped Irish history ever since, and continue to 
do so. Irish revolutionaries did not so much observe the French Revolution as they lived it, and 
in some cases died for it. Tone and his comrades were emblematic of the age of bourgeois and 
democratic revolution.  
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